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GRESHAM'S LAW OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Gresham's law, in case you've forgotten, says that "bad money 
drives out good." As Sir Thomas Gresham explained to Queen 
Elizabeth in 1558, the idea is that people will hold on to the good 
stuff, so that only bad coins will circulate. 
This is an early example of a more general concept economists 
call "adverse selection."! Adverse selection is the converse of Dar-
winian evolution. Darwin's theory of natural selection is based on 
the survival of the fittest. Economists have discovered, however, 
that in some situations selection weeds out the fittest, leaving only 
the inferior members of the group. For example, insurance is the 
best buy for those with the highest risks, so unless insurance compa-
nies take precautions, only the worst risks will buy their policies. 
This can be a fast track to insolvency for the insurer. Under some 
circumstances, adverse selection can lead to the total collapse of a 
market.2 
The concept of adverse selection helps explain some otherwise 
puzzling aspects of legal scholarship. Even a casual reader of major 
law reviews will rapidly discover two things. First, most generally 
accepted legal rules should be immediately discarded, according to 
our leading law reviews.J Second, the courts-particularly the 
Supreme Court-virtually never reach the obviously correct deci-
sion even in the simplest cases. It seems puzzling, however, that the 
legal system has managed to survive if its ineptitude is as great as 
the law reviews indicate.4 
Also puzzling is why judicial opinions are so stupid. The 
Harvard law review student who lambasts the manifest idiocy of the 
courts will, a year or so later, be a law clerk helping to draft opin-
ions, which in tum will be revealed as idiotic by a new generation of 
I. Following the advice of Nobel laureate George Stigler, this essay will employ "the 
most powerful techniques of modern mathematical economics, including ridicule." G. STIG-
LER, THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE MARKETPLACE 32 (1984). 
2. See Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay 
on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. EcoN. 629 (1976); Wilson, The Nature of 
Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection, II BELL J. EcoN. 108 (1980). See generally 
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. 
EcoN. 488 (1970). 
3. When a conventional rule should be retained, of course, it is never for the conven-
tional reasons. 
4. For a useful critique of current scholarly writing about constitutional law, see 
Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1979). 
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law review students. Unless Harvard graduates suffer a frightening 
decline in I.Q. immediately after graduation, the judicial opinions 
they draft cannot be that much dumber than their case notes. 
Adverse selection explains both puzzles. An example will 
make it easier to understand the process. Instead of a real example, 
which would leave some eminent law professor infuriated, a hypo-
thetical seems more prudent.s The seventh amendment requires 
trial by jury "in Suits at common law." For the past two hundred 
years, everyone has understood that trial by jury is not required in 
other civil suits, for example, actions "in equity" seeking injunc-
tions rather than damages. Obviously, a law review article defend-
ing this trite proposition would not be published by a major law 
review-in fact, it might not be published even by the most obscure 
law review in the country. On the other hand, a really clever argu-
ment that juries should be required in injunction actions would have 
much greater appeal to editors. 
This example may seem so extreme as to be fanciful.6 In fact, 
framing such an argument would not be all that difficult. The dis-
tinction between equity and law actions with regard to jury trial is 
largely historical, and would be relatively easy to attack on policy 
grounds. 7 The language of the seventh amendment could be 
squared with this result by construing "suits at common law" to 
mean any suit not based on a statute. Two strategies are open for 
dealing with the historical record--either deny that the framers' in-
tent is dispositive (the "living Constitution" idea),s or dredge up 
some historical fragments to support the theory (any good lawyer 
ought to be able to find some shreds of supporting evidence for any-
thing). Of course, with equal ingenuity one could make the opposite 
argument that the seventh amendment no longer applies to any 
case-"suit at common law" meant a suit under one of the common 
5. At least, I hope that no one has espoused this theory. If I am incorrect, I apologize 
to the authors involved. 
6. One way to rebut this would be to cite some equally fanciful recent articles. 
Although my colleague Roger Park has graciously given me several examples in his own field 
of expertise, discretion seems far the better part of valor here. Readers are invited to supply 
their own examples. 
7. If the role of the jury is to represent the voice of the community, such a role seems 
even more justified in many cases involving injunctions, where the court's order may affect 
the operations of major social institutions such as schools and prisons. As a practical matter, 
being a committee, the jury might have problems drafting a detailed court order and might 
also find it difficult to monitor compliance. These practical problems are surely not insur· 
mountable. For example, a special master might be employed to handle these details under 
the jury's general supervision, just as a corporate president functions under the aegis of the 
board of directors. 
8. After all, the framers had no idea of the role that federal judges would come to play 
in public law litigation, and hence could not anticipate the need for jury participation. 
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law writs, and no such writs are in use today. Given a couple of 
bright law students to assemble the evidence and fill in the details, a 
seminal article could result. 9 
Of course, such silly ideas are not the only things found in law 
reviews. For example, if the "new learning" on the seventh amend-
ment started to catch on, the status quo would become controver-
sial, and hence its defense would no longer be wholly trite. Possibly 
some member of the old guard would write an article defending the 
existing law. Even so, the law review literature would reflect a 
pretty even division of opinion on the subject. (Nobody is going to 
publish ten rejoinders to a novel argument.) In all likelihood, half 
of the articles in the literature will favor a position, even if ninety-
nine percent of the professors in the country think it's crazy. 
The point is that articles defending the legal status quo are 
much less likely to be published than articles attacking the status 
quo. The more sensible a legal rule, the less will be published sup-
porting it, while articles cleverly attacking it often will be taken as 
brilliant insights. Thus, the law review literature will be dominated 
by articles taking silly positions, while the sensible positions held by 
most law professors usually will be underrepresented. 
Adverse selection is even more obvious with case notes. Imag-
ine the following as a synposis of a case note: 
In Bryden v. Farber, the Supreme Court held X. Part I of the opinion correctly 
explained that this result is required by precedent. Part II showed that the framers 
of the Constitution would have agreed with the result. Part III showed that the 
opinion is sound social policy, and consistent with political theory and moral phi-
losophy. In short, the Court wrote a great opinion, leaving nothing much further to 
be said. 
No one with good enough test scores to get into law school would 
be stupid enough to imagine that any law review in the country 
would publish such a thing. Case notes lauding the Court's per-
formance will rarely be published; case notes damning the Court 
will find ready access to print. Hence, regardless of the merits of a 
judicial opinion, most published comments will be hostile. w 
It would be easy to blame the law review editors for this situa-
9. Any reader who is taken with these ideas (or is desperate for a topic for a tenure 
piece) should feel free to turn them into major Jaw review articles. Under the circumstances, 
I will understand if you choose not to attribute the idea to this column. (Similarly, if some 
economist in urgent need of a dissertation topic wishes to use "Adverse Selection in the Mar-
ket for Scholarship," he or she has my permission. Certainly, it should not be difficult to 
dress up the theory with a few equations and graphs along the lines of the sources cited supra 
note 2.) 
10. If the opinion is so good that no one can think of any significant criticisms, it will 
usually be ignored, unless it is so important that commentators feel obliged to discuss its 
future impact. Statistically, such opinions can be expected to be rare. 
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tion. Student editors are particularly ill-suited to discerning the dif-
ference between a valid insight and a clever sophism. They have 
intellectual ability, but not experience or breadth of knowledge. 
But other factors are also at work, and presumably operate even in 
disciplines where professors edit the journals. Scholarship is ex-
pected to be original, and defense of the conventional wisdom pro-
vides few opportunities for brilliance. The professor seeking 
scholarly recognition is well-advised to steer away from the true but 
trite, in favor of the false but novel. 
The pressures on young scholars are especially acute. The 
great names of the profession are so well established that even their 
sensible thoughts are publishable. The untenured beginner must 
work hard to attract attention, and taking a shocking position is a 
manifestly reasonable strategy. 
The argument so far suggests that the legal literature will gen-
erally be less sensible, taken as a whole, and more prone to eccen-
tricity, than the unpublished weight of scholarly opinion. For 
similar reasons, the scholarly literature will also show much greater 
fluctuations over time. For example, after a few years of heavy ex-
posure in the law reviews, the "law and economics" school became 
established and conventional, leading daring young scholars to turn 
to literary criticism and philosophy as arenas of professional strug-
gle. Soon, these too will have had their day, and the bright young 
path-breakers will turn elsewhere (sociobiology? cognitive psychol-
ogy? artificial intelligence?) in their search for the new and exciting. 
Can adverse selection be combated? Some countermeasures 
are possible. The current trend toward faculty-edited law reviews 
should help.ll A shift in professional attitudes, emphasizing 
thoughtfulness over "brilliance" would also be useful.I2 Perhaps 
someday there will be a Conference of Sensible Legal Scholars, 
though such a group would surely never attract the attention that 
its less sensible competitors have gotten from the mass media. 
A reduction in professional courtesy would also be helpful. In 
law, unlike some other fields, it is rare for a professor to attack a 
colleague's work in print.I3 Such attacks, when they occur at all, 
are likely to be restrained and extremely polite. With a few refresh-
II. Attacks on student law reviews are now so common that it seems unnecessary to 
elaborate on this point. 
12. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917 (1986). 
13. Note that even while making this suggestion, I prudently use a hypothetical article 
as my example, rather than cite any of the examples that come readily to mind. See supra 
note 5 and accompanying text. 
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ing exceptions,l4 one law professor never calls another a fool. Con-
sequently, silly ideas are not weeded out of the literature quickly. 
Sharper professional criticism would not prevent the publication of 
clever sophisms, but it would help limit the length of time such in-
anities were taken seriously. At least over time, we might hope that 
only the truly valid insights would survive.I5 Currently, however, a 
certifiably nutty idea can be repeated in major journals for years on 
end, before some brave soul ventures to suggest that "although 
there is some validity to the insights of Professor Wacko's theory, 
some serious qualifications should be stressed to a greater extent 
than has been previously recognized."I6 
In its implications for the scholarly literature, adverse selection 
implies a certain pessimism. Although it may be possible to combat 
adverse selection, the forces behind it are too strong to be wholly 
defeated. Thus, the scholarly literature will always have some bias 
in favor of the trendy as opposed to the sensible. 
In another sense, however, the implication is optimistic. It 
would be profoundly disheartening to believe that the mass of our 
professional colleagues are as silly as the law review literature 
would indicate. The theory of adverse selection tells us, however, 
that the sensible and thoughtful professor is not nearly as rare as the 
thoughtful and sensible article. For that we may be grateful. 
D.A.F. 
14. See Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1984); 
Leff, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1977). 
15. This is pretty much the classic "marketplace of ideas" rationale for the first amend-
ment, which is somewhat out of favor with scholars today. Still, even if it is naive to view 
society as a whole in this way, perhaps some room for hope exists that in the academy good 
ideas may have an edge in the struggle for survival (else what are we all doing?). 
16. A related problem is the tendency of many academics to see some virtue in every 
new idea. As Paul Meehl, a distinguished psychologist, once said, if some people thought the 
sun rose in the east and others thought it rose in the west. some well-meaning folks would say 
there was something to be said for both points of view and the truth is probably somewhere in 
between. 
